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The Age of Infrastructure:
The Triumph and Tragedy of the 
Progressive Civil Religion
Joseph Kiernan
“And what is faith? It is not born solely or largely by the actions 
of  one but through the contributions of  millions living in the 
spirit of  justice, with due consideration for the burdens and 
rights of  all others.” 
– Senator George W. Norris (R-NE)1
INTRODUCTION
 During the 1930s, simmering progressivism erupted 
into furious activity, initiating the Age of  Infrastructure in the 
United States of  America (U.S.). After decades of  piecemeal 
development of  roads and railways at the hands of  states and 
private corporations, Washington, D.C. took command. Gone 
were the railroad cabals of  Charles Crocker, James J. Hill, Mark 
Hopkins, Collis Huntington, Leland Stanford, and Cornelius 
Vanderbilt. Now, economic crisis and rural poverty had galvanized 
unprecedented popular support for government intervention. 
Under the guidance of  ideological heavyweights, the federal 
government seized the reins of  infrastructure development 
in the United States, fusing decades of  stewing resentment of  
corporate greed with a New Deal checkbook. Commissions, 
rather than corporations, laid asphalt, hung wire, bridged valleys, 
and dammed rivers. It was an era in which men of  a singular, 
unstoppable vision—David Lilienthal, George W. Norris, and 
Franklin D. Roosevelt—acquired the means to substantiate their 
dreams.
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 Thus, this is the story of  Senator George W. Norris, a 
Republican from Nebraska, who fought to expand government 
to an unprecedented level in his crusade against poverty and 
injustice. The bane of  the imperious Speaker Joseph Cannon 
(R-IL), Norris took on distinguished industrialist Henry Ford 
and won. Norris also challenged his own political party with his 
unyielding beliefs, leaving a legacy of  concrete and light.
 In his devotion to the progressive cause, Norris earned 
no shortage of  foes. Consequently, this is also the story of  his 
opponent, a Democrat-turned-Republican named Wendell 
Willkie of  Indiana, who fought Norris and the Senator’s creation, 
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), in an effort to protect 
free enterprise from government coercion. Willkie, armed with 
a passion that earned him national notoriety and widespread 
respect, sought to check the excesses of  the “progressive civil 
religion of  infrastructure” when its adherents, empowered by 
the government, began to infringe on the fundamental values of  
freedom. The TVA survives as an enduring symbol of  the New 
Deal, but its roots reached deeper than the Executive Branch’s 
campaign against the blight of  the Great Depression (1929-
1939).
 The progressive civil religion did not emerge ex nihilo in 
the tempestuous first hundred days of  the New Deal. Its origins 
were older, growing in the Great Plains among disaffected farmers 
and in the parlors of  Boston’s Brahmins. Its adherents ranged 
from the Protestant Nebraskans who sent George W. Norris to 
Congress for almost forty years, even when he committed the 
most egregious of  political heresies, to the social reforming elite 
of  Manhattan, who handed a young, brilliant civil servant named 
Robert Moses the power to reshape their world. The progressive 
civil religion took many shapes such as, inter alia, the campaigns 
of  trustbusters and yellow journalists to curb corporate power, 
the conservationism of  Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford 
Pinchot, and Social Security. However, in doing so, the New Deal 
empowered a unique strain of  the ecumenical progressive civil 
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religion: a progressive crusade for infrastructure. This was the 
faith of  Norris, mixing agrarian nationalism, progressivism, and 
populism with a deep distrust of  capitalism and an unrelenting 
confidence in the altruistic potential of  government.2  This radical 
denomination, the constant frustration of  internationalists and 
free marketers, was built on a core belief  that the government’s 
role was not only to moderate and to regulate the excesses of  
American capitalists, but also to serve as the egalitarian vanguard 
of  a better, fairer society.
 In the pursuit of  its agenda, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s administration handed the instruments of  state to 
men such as Norris to build infrastructure for the American 
people and to engineer a new society. When unchecked, the 
progressive civil religion led down a dark road to paternalism and 
arrogant trampling of  core American economic freedoms. At its 
worst, the progressive civil religion of  infrastructure was a self-
righteous crusade for a moral, just society that denigrated the 
folly of  individualism and the American belief  in productive self-
advancement. However, when moderated by legitimate criticism 
and motivated by unflagging commitment to the national need, 
this liberal creed could master the natural power of  the United 
States for the common good, and uplift millions to the American 
Dream. Its prophets seized upon a unique moment in American 
history, carving the physical scripture of  this populist faith into 
the land for posterity.
THE ROAD TO MUSCLE SHOALS
 The series of  events that led to the birth of  the TVA 
began far across the Pacific Ocean in the tense summer months 
of  1914. The spiraling diplomatic crisis in Europe spurred 
tensions that reverberated throughout the Kaiser’s Pacific 
possessions. As war threatened to break out across Europe, 
German Vice-Admiral Maximillian Reichsgraf  von Spee, on tour 
with the battleships SMS Scharnhorst and SMS Gneisenau en route 
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to Truk in Micronesia, contemplated the options for his fleet, 
the German East Asian Cruiser Squadron. Should the pressures 
of  the summer erupt into armed conflict, Germany would have 
limited naval resources abroad to defend its Pacific possessions.
 The Triple Entente Powers, especially Britain and her 
bilateral ally Japan, had relative naval superiority in the Asian 
Pacific Rim. Ultimately, when the July Crisis degraded into the 
inception of  the First World War (1914-1918) in August, Spee 
opted to sail towards South America, seeking neutral colliers 
and plotting a path back towards the Fatherland. British and 
American naval strategists eyed Spee’s voyage with concern as 
the Germans cruised toward Cape Horn, Chile. Although the 
East Asian flotilla faced defeat at the hands of  the British Royal 
Navy off  the Falkland Islands, the German escapades in the 
Pacific, combined with the privateering cruiser SMS Emden’s 
activities near British India, unnerved the Triple Entente Powers. 
 The German naval presence off  the Chilean coast raised 
concerns in the United States, a neutral but nervous power.3 At 
the time, Chile was the major exporter of  nitrates to the U.S., 
critical for producing fertilizers and explosives, both resources 
of  profound strategic importance. In the arid northern reaches 
of  the long littoral country, huge nitrate deposits at Antofagasta 
and Tarapacá attracted foreign firms from Britain, Germany, 
and the United States to harvest this vital ingredient for modern 
agriculture and weaponry.4
 With the advent of  hostilities, the Germans, now cut off  
from global trade by the British blockade, developed nitrogen 
fixation methods (the Haber process) to produce sufficient 
materiel domestically. The German innovations and German 
investments in hydroelectric energy to power the nitrate 
production ensured a steady supply of  shells for Krupp guns in 
northern France. They also helped feed the hungry Reich, where 
the agricultural output per acre outpaced most peer countries.5 
The United States, however, had no reserve supply of  nitrates, 
was still reliant on Chilean imports.6 In a time of  global war and 
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commerce raiding, the sea lines of  communication to Tarapacá 
seemed more vulnerable than ever.
 As the specter of  armed conflict loomed, American 
military planners fretted over the nitrate problem. On December 
27, 1915, Brigadier General Crozier, the U.S. Army Chief  of  
Ordnance, called for the development of  air-made nitrate 
production in the United States. With the potential for U.S. 
involvement rising, the United States’ dependency on Chile for 
critical munitions became a political issue. German privateering 
and heightened submarine warfare in the North Atlantic Ocean 
demonstrated how hostile maritime activity could interdict trade, 
potentially debilitating American military preparedness.7
 On June 3, 1916, in response to the mounting likelihood 
of  war, President Woodrow Wilson signed the National Defense 
Act (NDA), a comprehensive bill to reorganize and modernize 
the armed forces of  the United States.8 The nitrate issue was 
a component of  the broad legislative initiative. Under pressure 
from Muscle Shoals, Alabama, where business interests and 
impoverished southerners backed the construction of  a dam 
and a nitrate plant along the Tennessee River, Senator Oscar 
Underwood (D-AL) fought to include Section 124 in the NDA, 
the “Nitrate Supply.” Section 124 “empowered” the President to 
“determine the best, cheapest, and most available means for the 
production of  nitrates…upon any…river” and authorized the 
Executive “to construct, maintain, and operate…dams, locks, 
improvements to navigation, power houses…for the generation 
of  [electricity]” and “the production of  nitrates.”9 Muscle 
Shoals, positioned along the mighty Tennessee River, was an 
ideal location. The federally-run project would direct millions of  
federal dollars into the needy region and jumpstart an industrial 
awakening in a significant portion of  the sleepy South.
 In the early twentieth century, the Tennessee Valley had not 
shared in the economic prosperity brought by industrialization. 
The region, following the river from its sources in western 
Virginia and North Carolina, snaked from the highlands of  East 
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Tennessee past Knoxville and Chattanooga down into northern 
Alabama and Mississippi before turning northward back through 
West Tennessee to join the Ohio River near Paducah, Kentucky. 
Unlike the rich metallurgical mecca of  the upper Ohio River and 
the Great Lakes region, the Tennessee Valley was dependent on 
a faltering agricultural base. From the late nineteenth century 
to the 1920s and 1930s, the size of  farms diminished and the 
number of  tenant farmers tripled as population growth and 
productivity stagnated.10 Thus, for socioeconomic as well as 
military reasons, Muscle Shoals seemed an ideal location for the 
Section 124 nitrate plant and accompanying hydroelectric dam. 
 When word of  the site’s selection reached northern 
Alabama, thousands flocked to the Muscle Shoals/Florence 
area, looking for work.11 Frantic construction on the dam and 
nitrate plant proceeded as demand for fertilizer and munitions 
skyrocketed with the deployment of  American forces to the 
Western Front in Belgium and France. However, the end of  
the war and the return to normalcy ushered in congressional 
attempts to rein in wartime spending, including cutting the Muscle 
Shoals initiative. By March 1920, fiscal conservatives sank an 
appropriations package to continue work on the project, stalling 
construction indefinitely.12 The partially-completed facility would 
remain dormant while national business and political forces 
battled to see who would control the fate of  Muscle Shoals and 
the Tennessee Valley’s development. On one side, the greatest 
industrialist of  the country would seek to build a new Detroit on 
the Tennessee River. On the other, a mustachioed lawyer from 
McCook, Nebraska, would seek to stop him.
THE PROPHET FROM NEBRASKA
 They called him a “son of  the wild jackass,” a “radical,” a 
socialist, and a scourge sent to Washington, D.C. for Nebraska’s 
political schadenfreude.13 They also called him the “Fighting 
Liberal,” the “pillar of  the New Deal,” and “an uncompromising 
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foe of  special privilege.”14 Future President John F. Kennedy 
eulogized him in Profiles in Courage (1955). Businessmen damned 
his liberal tendencies. Presidents of  his own political party vetoed 
his bills and presidents of  the other political party supported 
his reelection. The people of  Nebraska chose him to represent 
them for forty years. To his admirers, he represented them 
and Americans everywhere, and he fought with an unbridled 
intensity to defend their democratic rights, to afford them 
economic opportunity, and to uplift them out of  poverty.15 For 
his defiance, his leadership, and his uncompromising empathy, 
George W. Norris is remembered as one of  the greatest populist 
senators in American history. 
George W. Norris, 
Senator from Nebraska and 
Leader of  the Progressive Civil Religion
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 He was also the legislative champion of  a faith, the 
progressive civil religion of  infrastructure. Acquainted with 
the trials of  farmers scratching a living out of  the Nebraska 
prairie and the ruinous consequences of  capitalist speculation, 
Norris maintained a deep compassion for the rural poor and a 
loathing for the capitalist industrialists. His devotion to populist 
progressivism bordered on zealotry. On politics and religion, 
Norris once wrote, “True love for humanity is an unselfish 
desire to perpetuate the welfare and happiness of  all the people 
comprising the government. I think religion is the same thing.”16 
He would attack economic problems with ideological ferocity 
throughout his long career on the national stage.
 Nebraskans elected Norris to the U.S. House of  
Representatives in 1902.17 At first, Norris played a quiet role 
in Congress, serving as a dutiful Republican. However, after 
five years in the House, his indignation towards the dictatorial 
management style of  Speaker Joseph Cannon grew and so 
did his penchant for legislative rebellion. In his autobiography, 
Fighting Liberal (1945), Norris reflected, “I doubt if  any Speaker 
in the history of  Congress was as ruthless as Joe Cannon was.”18 
Norris, therefore, decided that it was time to curtail the Speaker’s 
power. In May 1908, he challenged Cannon over the Ballinger-
Pinchot controversy, diving into a pool of  scandal that rocked 
the nation. 
 Specifically, Gifford Pinchot, a favorite of  conservationist 
progressives and hand-picked by President Theodore Roosevelt 
as the Chief  of  the U.S. Forest Service, came into conflict with 
President William Howard Taft’s Secretary of  the Interior, 
Richard Ballinger. Before leaving office, Roosevelt had announced 
that waterpower was for the “public interest” and directed 
Pinchot to reserve federal lands for hydroelectric purposes.19 
However, this led to a series of  escalating, and highly public, 
rhetorical brawls between Pinchot and Ballinger once the new 
Taft administration had settled in. When this conflict began to 
divide Congress, Cannon backed Ballinger and the White House, 
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who thought that Pinchot’s efforts were a conservationist bridge 
too far.20 Conversely, Norris backed the hardline progressive 
Pinchot. Eventually, Taft sacked Pinchot in January 1910, but 
Norris had led an effective revolt against the Speaker by aligning 
the progressives as a united front. The Ballinger-Pinchot 
controversy widened the divisions between the progressives, led 
by Theodore Roosevelt, and the conservatives, generally aligned 
with Taft. Furthermore, the controversy helped to break the 
back of  Cannon’s stranglehold on the House, giving Norris a 
starring role as an insurgent progressive who was willing and able 
to challenge the powers of  his own political party to advance his 
agenda and defend his values. In hindsight, this would not be the 
last time that hydropower elicited Norris to revolt.
 After his successful transition to the U.S. Senate in the 
1912 elections, Norris decided, once again, to buck the GOP 
in support of  Pinchot. In Pennsylvania’s 1914 U.S. Senate race, 
Norris travelled to the state and campaigned for Pinchot against 
the sitting Republican, Senator Boies Penrose.21 Interviewed 
by The New York Times a few weeks before the election, Norris 
remarked, “As a Republican Senator I consider it a duty to my 
conscience, to decent citizenship, and populist government to 
oppose with all my power the re-election of  Penrose.”22 Although 
Pinchot failed to defeat Penrose, Norris returned to Washington, 
D.C. and began developing his position on natural resources. He 
became a vigorous supporter of  the Raker Act of  1913 to allow 
San Francisco to create a reservoir in the Hetch Hetchy Valley, 
and a spirited opponent of  the private corporations which 
sought to “protect” the Valley from reservoir development so 
they could inhibit public control.23
 Beyond the sphere of  progressive domestic policy, 
Norris achieved fame and infamy for his positions on the rising 
tensions with Germany. A first-term member of  the U.S. Senate, 
he garnered harsh criticism for his unyielding opposition to 
American involvement in the First World War. For example, 
he went on to vote against the declaration of  war in April 
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1914.24 Additionally, feeling that his ensuing actions incited his 
constituents, Norris proposed a special recall election in March 
1917 so the people could reassess their support for him after he 
torpedoed an armed ship bill in the Senate through a filibuster.25 
The state committee denied his request for a recall, sparing him 
the public’s wrath. Norris, despite negative prognostications from 
journalists and political pundits, fared well in the Republican 
primary the next year and secured a victory in the 1918 general 
election against Governor John H. Morehead.26
 Overall, Norris’ first term in the U.S. Senate was 
eventful. His ardor for progressive causes and occasional self-
righteousness were emblematic of  the maverick career he would 
continue for the next three decades. Senator Norris came to be 
a standard-bearer for a distinctly populist, radical progressive 
civil religion, a new national faith that placed great confidence in 
the government’s ability to solve the ills of  mankind. Historian 
William Leuchtenburg described the progressive belief  structure 
as relying on the “Hamiltonian concept of  positive government” 
where actions were judged by “results achieved” rather than 
“means employed.”27 Focusing on American foreign policy, 
Leuchtenburg linked progressivism to imperialism. Although he 
was certainly a hardline progressive, Norris was no imperialist. 
His international viewpoint evoked William Jennings Bryan 
rather than Theodore Roosevelt or Woodrow Wilson. 
 Norris’ introspective progressive civil religion 
foreshadowed the spirit of  the 1930s. For him, the United States 
could afford little of  the burdens of  colonial investment when 
its own citizens cried out for relief. During his career, he did 
not just advocate for progressivism—labor rights, agricultural 
aid, and more direct democracy—he lived a progressive life of  
action seeking to solve problems through political means. His 
eternal focus was on the promotion of  the national welfare, 
often through his preferred policy bailiwick of  agricultural 
and infrastructural policies. Cautious of  foreign entanglements 
and disconnected from the progressive elites of  the coasts, 
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Norris united a robust faith in domestic progressivism with 
agrarian populism. Although he had supported Wilson’s liberal 
domestic policies, Norris’ strident opposition to the First World 
War defined his dichotomous civil religion—staunch domestic 
progressivism and national introversion. Fundamentally, Norris 
sought the transformation of  the regulatory liberal state to an 
activist national government. He sought to turn pen strokes into 
shovel-ready projects. He felt that the government must do what 
private industry did not do—provide for the people. Norris’ 
determination was unwavering despite consistent political 
setbacks, partially the result of  his stubbornness. The Classical 
Liberal zeitgeist of  the 1920s ensured that he was Norris, the 
Republican renegade. The progressive revolution of  the 1930s, 
the New Deal, put him on the front lines to build what he 
believed in—the TVA.
FORD VERSUS NORRIS
 On July 8, 1921, George W. Norris’ campaign for the TVA 
began. With the federal funding drought stunting the Muscle 
Shoals project, auto magnate Henry Ford submitted a proposal 
to acquire the nitrate plant and dam system through a deal in 
which his company would operate the facility. This offer included 
a one hundred year “lease on the Wilson Dam, the No. 3 dam 
and electric installation, when complete.”28 For southerners, the 
Ford proposal appeared ideal. The project would be completed 
and Ford would industrialize the Tennessee Valley, supposedly 
bringing with him the high-paying manufacturing jobs that had 
provided for thousands of  families throughout the Midwest. 
Herbert Hoover, the Secretary of  Commerce in President Warren 
G. Harding’s administration, voiced his support and admitted 
that “whatever may be the result, Mr. Ford’s offer does prove 
what the public associations [of  the region] have contended, that 
the completion of  the project has a commercial value.”29 The 
offer, however, required congressional action for approval first.
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 As the nitrate plant fell within the purview of  agricultural 
management, the Ford deal bill, S.3420, was sent to the Senate 
Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Its chairman was 
Senator George W. Norris. The Ford offer and the Muscle 
Shoals issue became the subjects of  a lengthy series of  hearings 
in the Committee throughout 1922. The bill’s consideration was 
complicated by the presence of  competing business interests 
which sought to take Muscle Shoals for themselves. Furthermore, 
the ambiguous contractual language in the bill obfuscated 
its potential ramifications. This led to a series of  complicated 
discussions peppered with civil engineering technicalities. Norris, 
however, came prepared.
 The testimony from the committee hearings on the 
bill reveals the strong support from a number of  influential 
southerners for the proposed deal, especially the Alabama 
delegation. It also illustrates Norris’ position on the appropriate 
role for private corporations and moneyed interests in the 
production of  nitrates and, more importantly, electricity.30 
Hearings began on February 16, 1922, when a delegation from 
Tennessee led by Governor Alf  Taylor arrived to testify. Taylor, 
highly supportive of  the Ford offer, commenced his address to 
the Committee with the following statement, in which he cited 
renown inventor Thomas Edison:
[Edison] said in my presence that it was impossible to 
conceive the immensity of  the power that could be 
produced by that plant when completed, and that the 
benefits to be derived to the country at large were also 
inconceivable, and that Henry Ford was the man to take 
hold and operate it when it was completed, because he was 
an honest man, and a man of  splendid judgment, and a 
man who had succeeded, and a man who had the money.31 
Curiously, Taylor’s speech continued with a broad appeal against 
sectionalism and particularism. Perhaps aware of  the geographic 
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diversity of  the sixteen committee members and knowing that 
the economic benefit of  the development would be concentrated 
in the northern Alabama area, only relevant to Senators Pat 
Harrison (D-MS) and J. Thomas Heflin (D-AL), Taylor adopted 
a nationwide tone, remarking that “what is good for one section 
of  this Union is good for every section.”32 The memories of  the 
Civil War were still fresh in the minds of  many. Taylor understood 
that to promote regional infrastructural development, a national 
justification had to be made. When Norris attempted to advance 
his own legislation, he would take this lesson to heart. 
 Later that day, the Committee heard from Robert 
Campbell, a business organizer from Johnson City, Tennessee. 
Attempting to elucidate the motivation for Ford’s interest in 
the project and the bill’s ambiguous language concerning the 
requirement to actually produce nitrates, the Committee pressed 
Mr. Campbell on what he considered to be the industrialist’s 
intentions. Campbell, scrambling for answers, stated, “Mr. Ford’s 
ambitions can not [sic] any longer demand money. He must 
want to…build a monument.”33 Unsatisfied, the Committee 
members asked Campbell whether, under the proposed statute, 
Ford would be barred from transitioning to a more profitable 
industry as profits from fertilizer production were capped at eight 
percent. Campbell responded, “I trust Mr. Ford…You have to 
trust somebody.”34 Senator John W. Harreld (R-OK), suspicious 
of  Ford’s motives, noted that the project was not “altruism.”35 
Norris, who in June of  the previous year had proposed the 
creation of  a “Federal Farmer’s Export Financing Corporation” 
to buy crops from farmers for international resale, agreed with 
Harreld’s sentiments.36 It would later become clear that in those 
cases where a key national interest was concerned, Norris would 
prefer to inject altruism through the government rather than 
entrusting a private citizen, such as Henry Ford, to do so instead.
 After a brief  hiatus, the hearings resumed on April 10, 
1922. Once again, the witness, this time Senator Underwood 
from Alabama, argued that Ford was pursuing the deal for 
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altruistic reasons. Underwood, who had a clear and compelling 
interest in facilitating the industrialization of  the Muscle Shoals 
area through Ford’s proposal, opined with saccharine hyperbole. 
After lambasting opponents of  the deal, Underwood orated that 
“[Ford] is prepared to do a great patriotic act for the people 
of  the United States by limiting the amount of  his profits and 
producing fertilizer for them as cheaply as possible.”37
 When the President of  the Alabama Power Company, 
Thomas W. Martin, came to testify on April 11 and April 18, 
Chairman Norris asked why Alabama power customers faced 
such high prices and massive discrepancies in kilowatt prices.38 
Norris noted that “there is something wrong if  [Alabama 
municipalities] pay you for their electricity less than a cent and 
sell it to their people for 12 cents.”39 Martin provided a series of  
evasive answers, to which Norris provided the counterexample 
of  the low prices enjoyed by electricity customers in Ontario, 
Canada, where the government ran the power system.40 Ontario 
Hydro, which relied on extensive hydroelectric installations 
along the Niagara River, would become a model for Norris as he 
conducted independent research on the viability of  a government-
run power generation and distribution corporation.41 
 By May 1, Norris’ patience for Fordists and corporate 
envoys was wearing thin. William B. Mayo, Chief  Engineer of  the 
Ford Motor Company, arrived to testify before the Committee. 
Norris, unsatisfied with the ambiguity of  answers on Ford’s 
ultimate intentions for the plant and dams, was concerned that 
the industrialist would exploit the contract’s loopholes to dupe 
the government.42 After an endless series of  inane prevarications 
from Mayo, Norris’ tolerance expired and he interjected, “I have 
been wondering, Mr. Mayo, why is it that, representing Mr. Ford, 
you are not willing to take the committee and the Congress into 
your full confidence and let them know just exactly what you 
expect to do with this power if  you get it.”43 Norris continued 
with his critical rhetoric against private, corporate infrastructure 
improvements.44 The ongoing testimonials failed to allay his 
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fears that once Henry Ford died, the company would repurpose 
the nitrate facility. Questioning the chairman of  the Tennessee 
River Improvement Association Executive Committee, J.W. 
Worthington, Norris expressed his irritation that businessmen 
expected the government to grant Ford a carte blanche and trust 
that his motives aligned with the public interest. Norris remarked, 
“But [Ford] is not the only man in the country that is good, 
although he may be one of  the best of  them.”45
 Considering Muscle Shoals a matter of  national 
importance, Norris sparred with Worthington, alleging that 
it was the government’s role to protect the people from Ford. 
Worthington shot back at the Chairman, quipping, “The people 
of  this country don’t want to be saved.”46 With that incendiary 
remark, Worthington touched upon a major component of  
Norris’ progressive American civil religion. Norris believed that 
the people needed protection from the profit-driven capitalist 
class, including Henry Ford, who would use any opportunity to 
price, gouge, profiteer, or pilfer. To that end, Norris maintained 
a conviction that it was the government’s role to intervene or 
preempt to safeguard the public welfare. Conservatives would 
probably have agreed with Worthington, portraying Norris as 
self-righteous. But the exchange with Worthington revealed 
the Nebraska Senator’s faith that Norris knew what the people 
needed even if  they did not, for he knew how to protect them 
from the dangers of  antidemocratic capitalist elites, and he 
knew that government must be the shield. These convictions 
undergirded Norris’ political philosophy.
 A New York Times article from May 10, 1922, captured 
Norris’ opposition to the Ford deal. Norris remarked that he 
would permit “no corporation” to take over the Muscle Shoals 
properties and felt that the bill included an “unconscionable 
contract.”47 Agreeing with a statement from the Merchant’s 
Association on a prior Ford offer to the Secretary of  War, Norris 
believed that a deal with a corporation on Muscle Shoals would 
represent a major loss for the government.48 Four days earlier on 
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May 6, Norris once again lost his temper in an interaction with 
a business representative from the Air Nitrates Corporation. 
Expressing similar sentiments to his comments in April, Norris 
remarked:
You haven’t any assurance that this corporation will 
benefit the people one iota, and you cannot demonstrate 
it or show it, and that is where the curse comes in. It 
will be just like any other corporation. It will be owned 
by somebody else and will be manipulated just the same 
as the International Harvester Co. has been manipulated 
and is being manipulated right now, and the farmer will 
not be helped any.49 
 With a keen interest in the benefits of  hydropower 
and cheap fertilizer for American farmers, Norris saw Muscle 
Shoals as an opportunity to replenish the ruined soils of  the 
impoverished Tennessee Valley and to give the people access to 
affordable electricity. Residents and business interests in the region 
were eager for the government to complete the dam project for 
energy generation and navigation purposes. However, the cagy 
testimony of  the parade of  corporate officials and the weakness 
of  the government position in S.3420 convinced Norris that it 
must be Washington, D.C., not Wall Street, to assume leadership 
at Muscle Shoals. Therefore, Norris launched his own effort, 
proposing a government-controlled corporation.
 Throughout the hearings, Norris blamed pro-Ford 
propaganda for the strong public support for the bill’s passage. 
Norris’ opposition to the Ford proposal earned him many 
enemies throughout the South, where he was burned in effigy 
for halting development along the Tennessee River.50 Senators 
Charles McNary (R-OR) and Norris clashed with their 
Democratic colleagues, Alabamians Heflin and Underwood, in 
a continuous war of  words.51 The tensions did not abate during 
the following years. Heflin called Norris’ 1924 Muscle Shoals 
Penn History Review     27 
The Age of Infrastructure
 bill “Bolshevistic.”52 Residents of  the region were furious with 
Norris. However, the Teapot Dome Scandal galvanized public 
outrage at the apparent collusion of  government and private 
companies to ravage national natural resources.53 On July 15, 
1922, the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry rejected 
the Ford proposal by a vote of  nine to seven.54 The Committee 
also halted Norris’ government-controlled proposal by a vote of  
nine to five.55 Both proposals later went to the Senate floor as 
minority reports.
 Throughout the entirety of  the Muscle Shoals debate, 
Norris couched his arguments and opinions in his progressive 
civil religious attitude. Once, he remarked that government was 
a “religion that does not consider the conditions which exist 
beyond the grave but confines its consideration to happiness in 
this life.”56 For Norris, the problem with corporate leadership 
in matters of  national interest returned to the initial point 
established by Senator Harreld: altruism. The Nebraskan 
Senator held a deep suspicion of  business motives, as shown by 
his intense interrogation of  corporate witnesses, and believed, 
rightfully or not, that any “damn corporation” would exploit the 
government and the people in the pursuit of  profit, regardless of  
the consequences.57
 After the hearings and aware of  the economic situation 
facing the region, Norris envisioned a vanguard role for the 
government in the Tennessee Valley. The 1920s would be marked 
by his repeated attempts to push his legislative proposals, the 
forerunners to the TVA, through Congress and into law. Always 
a renegade, Norris would take on the succession of  presidents 
of  his own political party to realize this vision.
THE REPUBLICAN REBEL
 In June 1925, George F. Milton, a reporter for The 
Independent, described the Tennessee Valley as “the Ruhr of  
America,” an allusion to the heartland of  German industrial 
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strength. However, unlike its German counterpart, the Tennessee 
Valley languished in poverty and underdevelopment. Also, unlike 
the Ruhr, the Tennessee Valley, which Milton projected to be 
“the very heart of  industrial America,” still had not resolved the 
political impediments to its economic salvation. The Wilson Dam 
in Muscle Shoals was completed that year, but the hydroelectric, 
fertilizer, and progressive (Norris) interests had opposing views 
on what to do with its electricity.58 As Milton attests, the people 
understood that “the Tennessee River is rightly a national 
institution,” and Norris thought that national institutions should 
be controlled by their owners, the citizens of  the United States.59
 Throughout the 1920s, Norris waged a successful 
legislative war of  attrition against conservative adversaries to gain 
public control of  Muscle Shoals. Not only did Norris fight for a 
comprehensive, government-led effort, but he also campaigned 
to derail Senator Underwood’s attempts to pass legislation 
that merely focused on fertilizer production. Furthermore, in 
December 1924, Norris denounced President Calvin Coolidge’s 
alleged attempt to cede Muscle Shoals to the “water power trust.” 
He argued that the President’s intent was to deliver to Wall Street 
“a concession so great that it will make Teapot Dome [Scandal] 
look like a pinhead.”60 In doing so though, Norris’ attacks 
spawned strange political bedfellows as Underwood the Southern 
Democrat allied with Coolidge the Massachusetts Republican 
against Norris the progressive Nebraska Republican.61 For 
Norris, party loyalty meant nothing compared to the national 
imperative of  economic development at Muscle Shoals. Also, 
to Coolidge’s chagrin, Norris had backed independent Robert 
“Fighting Bob” La Follette Sr. over Coolidge in the presidential 
election of  1924, which surely did not endear the Senator to the 
new President.62 Underwood subsequently defended Coolidge 
and branded Norris as a “Populist” demagogue.63 Although they 
were defeated, Coolidge and Underwood would exact vengeance 
when Norris’ own proposals reached the Senate floor soon 
afterward.
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 Norris introduced a proto-TVA bill, S.J. Res. 2147, in 
January 1926, but it died in committee. However, in December 
1927, Norris’ succeeding bill, S.J. Res. 46 or the “Morin-Norris 
resolution,” which provided “for the completion of  Dam. No. 
2 at Muscle Shoals and the steam plant at Nitrate Plant No. 2,” 
was passed by Congress. In a scathing attack, The Washington Post 
labeled the Morin-Norris bill as “communism, pure and simple” 
and “essentially un-American.”64 Unsurprisingly, Coolidge 
exercised a pocket veto to kill the legislation in June 1928.65 In 
response, Norris launched a furious assault against Coolidge, 
threatening to break up the Republican Party and organize a 
third-party Farmer-Progressive ticket to challenge the Republican 
establishment in the year’s general election.66 This proved the 
depth of  Norris’ devotion to pro-farmer, progressive policies. 
Not only did he animadvert the President as a stooge of  the 
“power trust,” but he also discussed a full-scale rebellion against 
his own political party’s administration and the party leadership 
itself. Were Norris a marginalized radical, these actions may have 
seemed less unusual. However, he enjoyed respect and legislative 
support throughout Congress, which made his defiance all the 
more exceptional. For Norris, the call of  his civil faith was too 
strong to bow to Coolidge, or to any non-progressive president.
 In 1928, Norris broke party ranks again and endorsed 
New York Democratic Governor Al Smith for the presidency.67 
Although Smith’s “wet,” Catholic background proved unpopular 
with Nebraskans, Norris believed that the Governor’s 
compassion for the common people warranted his support over 
the free marketeering Republican challenger, Secretary Herbert 
Hoover. However, Hoover’s victory ensured another unfriendly 
conservative White House for Norris. With the new president 
assuming office in May 1929 though, Norris tried to gain support 
for his government-control effort again with a new legislative 
bill, S.J. Res. 49. Indeed, the people of  the Tennessee Valley 
had grown tired of  the government’s vacillation on the Muscle 
Shoals project. As Congress turned the dam and nitrate system 
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into a political football, the farmers and businessmen of  the 
region wished for some form of  action. Even the “communist” 
government-operated proposal floated by Norris, therefore, was 
gaining traction. 
 Reporting on the situation in the Deep South from 
Florence, Alabama, journalist Anne O’Hare McCormick wrote, 
“Inoculation against the idea of  ‘government in business’ goes 
far and deep, particularly in regions like [the Tennessee Valley], 
where government does not fulfill even the humblest citizen’s 
ideal of  efficiency or honesty.”68 As the woe of  the Great 
Depression deepened, the people of  the Tennessee Valley looked 
to Washington, D.C. for a “second reconstruction.” Recording 
the local reaction to the new legislation, McCormick observed, 
“A few days after the second passage of  the Norris resolution 
declaring that Muscle Shoals shall be owned and operated by 
the government, the valley is once more stirred by the hope 
of  action as by a fresh wind from the north.”69 With broad 
legislative support, Norris’ bill passed Congress and headed 
down Pennsylvania Avenue to Hoover’s desk.70
 Like his Republican predecessor, President Hoover, 
standing adamant against federal control, vetoed the bill. The 
President commented that opposition to Norris’ agenda 
“appears to be cause for denunciation as being in league with 
the power companies.”71 A few days prior, Norris had alleged 
that the power trust sought to manipulate the U.S. government 
and appropriate her resources, hinting that Hoover was caught 
in its corporate enchantment. Lambasting the utilities, Norris 
stated, “What is the raw material of  this monopoly? It is the 
rivers and the brooks that flow from the mountains to the sea. 
Is it not true that the people own these natural resources?”72 
Not only did Norris believe that the power trust exerted undue 
monopolistic influence, but he also felt that it could coerce the 
media to do its bidding. When asked for a comparative example 
of  a private versus public system, Norris usually referred to 
the Canadian public versus American private prices along the 
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Niagara River. However, analyzing Ontario Hydro, journalist 
Thomas Woodlock of  The Wall Street Journal excoriated public-
operated power in a November 1930 article alleging that private 
plants were more economical than public ones.73 The ferocity 
of  journalistic opposition to government-led Tennessee Valley 
proposals tended to lend some credence to the Senator’s 
statements that corporate power interests were colluding with 
the media to halt public expansions. 
 Hoover’s veto infuriated Southern Democrats and 
Midwestern Progressives who stood against the pro-Hoover 
Northeastern Republicans. The Senate attempted an override, 
but fell six votes short of  the two-thirds majority needed to 
do so with forty-nine votes for and thirty-four votes against.74 
Authoring a long, detailed explanation for his veto, Hoover 
suggested that Alabama and Tennessee could collaborate to 
develop the Tennessee Valley. He did, however, voice support for 
the construction of  the Cove Creek (later Norris) Dam on the 
Clinch River for flood regulation.75 Hoover felt that he needed 
Construction of  Cove Creek Dam, later renamed Norris Dam 
in honor of  Senator George W. Norris
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to delineate between the appropriate realms of  government and 
private operations. In his justification, the President remarked, 
“I hesitate to contemplate the future of  our institutions, of  our 
government and of  our country if  the preoccupation of  its 
officials is to be no longer the promotion of  justice and equal 
opportunity, but is to be devoted to barter in the markets. That 
is not liberalism, it is degeneration.”76
 Though businessmen and conservatives viewed Norris’ 
Muscle Shoals proposals as “degeneration,” the winds of  political 
change were blowing across the United States. The serious 
economic crisis was plunging millions into poverty. In particular, 
the rural poor faced the brunt of  the Great Depression, a 
calamity widely pinned to the excessive greed and speculation 
of  Wall Street financiers. As demands for government assistance 
increased, allegations of  socialistic planning decreased. 
Furthermore, the need for basic necessities, which increasingly 
included the provision of  electricity, aligned with the progressive 
ethos that in matters of  national interest, the moral imperative 
of  the ends justified the unilateralism of  the means. Seeing it 
as a modern necessity, Norris viewed electricity as “the breath 
of  life of  the machine age” and “essential to human activity.”77 
Economic Liberals such as Hoover, Coolidge, and later, Wendell 
Willkie saw electric power as a force of  progress, granted to 
the country through the vibrancy of  American capitalism and 
competition. Norris saw power as tantamount to a civil right. 
PROGRESSIVISM EMPOWERED
 Fresh off  his victory over President Herbert Hoover in 
the presidential election of  1932, President-Elect Franklin D. 
Roosevelt travelled to Alabama in January 1933 to tour Muscle 
Shoals. He delivered an informal speech on January 21 in 
Montgomery to a crowd that included the Governor of  Alabama. 
Roosevelt fused reverence for Alabama’s past with his progressive 
vision for the country. His message was clear. Standing in the 
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“birthplace of  the Confederacy,” Roosevelt outlined a bold 
future for the stagnating, suffering South, painting a future of  
“better opportunities and better places for living for millions” of  
people through “planning.”78
 As President Roosevelt prepared to deliver a furious 
volley of  ambitious New Deal legislation in the spring of  1933 
after his inauguration, Norris worked to bring his dream to 
fruition. Collaborating with Representative Lister Hill (D-AL) in 
the House of  Representatives, Norris developed S.J. 1272, known 
as the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of  1933. According to S.J. 
1272, the TVA was to be governed by a board of  commissioners 
selected by presidential appointment. In addition to ordering the 
operation of  experimental plants and laboratories for fertilizer 
production, the bill authorized the TVA to “produce, distribute, 
and sell electric power.”79 A New York Times article on the bill 
captured the novelty and revolutionary nature of  the TVA 
proposal:
The 1933 edition of  the Norris bill for the development 
of  Muscle Shoals follows the original model, with the 
[TVA] tacked on. Cheap fertilizer for the farmer, cheap 
light and power for the housewife. They are to be sought 
by putting government, directly, into the fertilizer and 
utility business, on almost a cosmic scale. The power 
plants are to be made a weapon in the war on the ‘Power 
Trust.’80
 Norris, who had faced recalcitrant Republican opposition 
during the 1920s, only received support from Roosevelt, whom 
Norris had supported in the presidential election of  1932. In 
April and May 1933, President Roosevelt worked to speed the 
TVA bill to passage.81 In a speech to Congress, Roosevelt spoke 
in the language of  the progressive civil religion of  infrastructure, 
calling for the “return to the spirit and vision of  the pioneer” 
through government “planning.” He preached that it was time 
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for the United States to create “a corporation clothed with the 
power of  Government…for the general social and economic 
welfare of  the Nation.”82 Where there was no hope, government 
would provide. Where there was no altruism, government would 
provide. The message from Roosevelt to an audience of  millions 
of  unemployed workers and tenant farmers, therefore, evoked 
the message that the government was there and ready to provide 
for and safeguard its constituents.
 On May 4, 1933, the TVA bill passed for the seventh 
and final time with a massive congressional majority. The House 
versions were less aggressive than Norris’ proposal, giving more 
room for government partnerships with private firms. The 
Nebraskan’s bill envisioned a TVA vertically integrated to master 
the river, derive electricity from dams, and then electrify the 
countryside. As usual, Norris garnered more Democratic than 
Republican support for his agenda.83 His image transformed as he 
brought his legislative power to bear for the President. Roosevelt 
needed a torchbearer in the Senate and Norris was a true believer 
in the New Deal. For Norris, the Roosevelt revolution was an 
opportunity to restore the power of  the people and democratize 
the progress that conservatives and big businesses thought must 
come from free enterprise. The TVA was a landmark change. 
While progressives had sought to regulate corporate greed and 
bust trusts for decades, progressive government would now 
replace business in the pursuit of  national progress. Thus, Norris 
the “son of  the wild jackass” was now Norris the New Dealer.84 
 Not all citizens and politicians shared the President’s 
enthusiasm for the TVA or for the unprecedented breadth 
of  Norris’ proposal. An article in The New York Times from 
April 1933 warned that the TVA should seek to develop the 
region in conjunction with existing private utilities. Concerned 
Norris’ proposal was too radical, the article suggested that the 
House versions provided a more reasonable compromise and 
consideration of  the various interests with stakes in the Tennessee 
Valley business:
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If  the Government is to embark on this venture at all, it 
is earnestly to be hoped that these saving clauses [from 
the House] will be retained in the bill, and an opportunity 
thus afforded the new Tennessee Valley Authority to 
work out its grandiose plans in cooperation with the 
utilities, rather than in cutthroat competition with them.85 
 Despite the article’s hope for “cooperation,” however, 
the relationship between the TVA and the private utilities would 
be defined by “cutthroat competition.” In fact, the seriousness of  
the competition dragged the TVA’s attention from dam-building 
to the U.S. Supreme Court. As the TVA’s mandate expanded, 
either through statute, precedent, or unilateral decision-
making, the private utilities’ propensity and ability to cooperate 
diminished, souring and hardening into indignant animosity. 
Fighting the full force of  the Roosevelt administration would 
prove a herculean feat, but as soon as the TVA started to act, 
opposition coalesced. Nevertheless, on June 16, 1933, less than 
a month after President Roosevelt signed the compromise bill, 
the Tennessee Valley Authority initiated operations. The federal 
government was officially in the power business.86
THE TRIUMPH OF THE
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
 Norris’ crusade to create the TVA was the signature 
campaign of  the progressive civil religion of  the 1930s. 
Distrustful of  corporations, skeptical of  state cooperation, 
and concerned for many of  the impoverished farmers of  
rural Tennessee and Alabama, the Nebraska Senator laced his 
statements and speeches with the language of  progressivism. It 
was the faith of  the Age of  Infrastructure. No longer content 
to check the excesses and injustices of  the free market, Norris 
and his colleagues let government lead the way through planning. 
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The spirit of  the progressive civil religion of  infrastructure went 
beyond the legislative birth of  the TVA and Norris’ determined 
efforts—it permeated the form and function of  the TVA as it 
reengineered southern Appalachia. 
 President Roosevelt appointed a three-man Board of  
Directors—David Lilienthal, Arthur Morgan, and Harcourt 
Morgan—to manage the TVA and oversee its ambitious agenda. 
The TVA’s plans for the region were bold. By the fall of  1944, 
nine main river dams were completed and generated electricity 
along the course of  the Tennessee River from Fort Loudoun 
Dam to Kentucky Dam, 628 miles downstream. Incorporating 
the two existing dams on the Tennessee River, Wilson and Hales 
Bar, the TVA built the remainder of  the main river dams as well 
as a number of  fossil fuel power plants, a plethora of  bridges, 
and numerous smaller electricity-generating and storage dams 
along the river’s tributaries.87 The TVA tamed the river through 
the creation of  massive reservoirs covering thousands of  acres 
and enabled navigation from Knoxville to the Gulf  of  Mexico.88 
Norris Dam, renamed in honor of  the Senator, dammed the 
Clinch River, a tributary of  the Tennessee River northeast of  
Knoxville. Formerly known as the Cove Creek Dam, the Norris 
Dam was the first line of  defense against damaging floods which 
devastated the Tennessee Valley, the Ohio Valley, and down to 
the Mississippi River. Apart from local destruction, frequent 
flooding degraded the already-depleted soil of  the Tennessee 
Valley.
 Part of  the TVA’s Norris Dam project included the 
construction of  a local settlement, also called Norris. The village, 
a master-planned community, included communal amenities and 
modern conveniences. Unlike many works camps of  the Great 
Depression, Norris was designed as a permanent community—the 
TVA’s model community.89 Even religious life was reformulated 
as a modern, ecumenical civil exercise. For example, the secular 
public school was the designated place of  worship for the 
inhabitants of  the village. While the village’s small size and rural 
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milieu influenced the lack of  appropriate facilities, the image of  
a unified community engaging in a religious exercise fell in-line 
with the vision of  the progressive civil religion of  infrastructure. 
Individual impediments to unity were to be overcome. Every 
prayer was a civil communion, and every concrete pour was 
alms for a needy nation. This civil ecumenicalism produced 
strident critics in the 1930s South. For example, responding 
to TVA regulations on church construction, a local southern 
governor admitted that he did not appreciate Norris’ progressive 
ecumenicalism, identifying such practices with “communism.”90 
But the TVA did not build a “godless town” in Norris, Tennessee; 
it built a new universal devotion—the religion of  communitarian 
progress in which all citizens could share material salvation on 
Earth. In his autobiography, Senator Norris admitted, “religious 
prejudice is the most deeply imbued prejudice that exists in 
the human heart.”91 Thus, the TVA brought the totality of  life 
within the public sphere, engineering egalitarianism through the 
progressive civil religion of  infrastructure.
 Much of  the TVA’s physical infrastructure also embodied 
the progressive civil religious ideals of  a perfectible society. To 
link Knoxville to the dam and the village, the TVA built a parkway 
praised by national critics for its fusion of  natural beauty with 
functionality.92 Under the TVA, a public work was more than a 
mere concrete highway or a hydroelectric dam. Aesthetic quality 
and permanence were key features, designed to maximize the 
experience and welfare of  the people. In every dam’s control 
room, the words “Built for the People of  the United States” 
were emblazoned in steely letters for all to see. Progressives 
of  the past had sought to cordon off  expanses of  American 
wilderness from negative human interference—conserving 
in the face of  capitalist progress. Progressives of  the Age of  
Infrastructure, however, sought to modify the world to suit their 
design for the people—engineering the alternative to capitalist 
progress. The architectural style of  the dams and other TVA 
facilities epitomized the forceful modernity that accompanied 
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this governing philosophy. A mixture of  brutalism, elegance, 
and industrial might defined the TVA dams along the Tennessee 
River and its tributaries. Art deco motifs graced turbine halls and 
bold lines defined the concrete hulks slicing into the verdant hills 
of  East Tennessee.
 The TVA’s quantitative contributions were as impressive 
as its buildings. By 1938, the TVA employed 13,000 men and 
women.93 By 1941, before the completion of  the last several dams, 
the TVA had 2,000,000 kilowatts of  capacity and it had carved 
out a 650-mile navigation channel along the sinuous Tennessee 
River. Scholars estimated that by the end of  1943, nearly $722 
million government dollars had been invested in navigation, 
flood control, and power projects for the TVA, amounting to 
an enormous sum. Millions of  southerners drew cheap power 
from the TVA grid through municipal and community local 
distributors. Thousands more enjoyed the parks, lakes, and 
recreational facilities built by the TVA along the winding course 
of  the river.94 The TVA was more than a development agency. It 
became the engine for the “arsenal of  democracy.”
 At one point during the Second World War, the TVA 
employed 42,000 workers. Its dams provided the energy for 
aluminum production, vital for the United States’ air forces. 
It also supplied power to a mysterious government project at 
Oak Ridge, Tennessee, where Manhattan Project engineers 
harnessed the TVA’s vast electrical resources to enrich uranium 
for the United States’ first atomic weapons.95 The United States 
government used its investment in the TVA, along with its 
hydroelectric projects along the Columbia River in the Pacific 
Northwest, to beat ploughshares into swords and defeat fascism. 
Writing in 1958, author John Kyle reflected on the successes 
of  the TVA’s new society. Describing its developmental 
achievements and international fame, Kyle explained, “To many 
people the world over, the Tennessee Valley Authority represents 
the highest achievement of  American democracy.”96 
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Propoganda Poster from the Second World War 
Flaunting the Efficiency and Effectiveness of  the Tennessee Valley Authority 
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY IN TURMOIL
 The TVA’s flurry of  construction did not sate Norris’ 
appetite for progressive development. He set his sights on 
larger quarry: the Mississippi River Valley. In December 1935, 
Norris, extrapolating from a former plan for a “Missouri Valley 
Authority,” sought to cover half  the country under the aegis of  
a gargantuan government corporation.97 By 1937, his dreams 
were even more expansive. Delivering a statement at the White 
House Executive Office, Norris declared that “he was planning 
to introduce a bill authorizing creation of  an agency to build 
throughout the country a system of  flood control and power 
plants similar to the Tennessee Valley Authority.”98 Unfortunately 
for Senator Norris though, his bill and his dream of  a national 
TVA-esque agency died in the Senate.99 Still, this disappointment 
would prove the least of  his worries. The enemies of  the 
progressive civil religion of  infrastructure were coalescing.
 Throughout the 1930s, private system after private system 
sold out to the local municipalities and to the TVA—for example, 
Tennessee Public Service Co., Tennessee Light & Power Co., West 
Tennessee Power & Light Co., and Tennessee Electric Power Co. 
all sold off  operations to the TVA.100 While these acquisitions 
expanded the TVA’s ability to reach underserved populations, 
its imperious behavior provoked intense backlash from utility 
companies. The adoption of  the TVA model in other states was 
also faltering. Plans for a New York TVA-esque agency along the 
St. Lawrence River were derailed by inadequate funding measures 
and lack of  congressional support.101 Meanwhile, Norris’ former 
secretary and Comptroller General J.R. McCarl had “sharply 
questioned some of  [the] TVA’s purchasing methods.” On the 
defensive, therefore, the Nebraska Senator played his favorite 
political card by accusing McCarl of  allegiances to the “power-
trust.”102
 Norris, responding to these problems and other constant 
challenges to the TVA’s rather limited statutory authority, 
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proposed a bill to grant the TVA the explicit prerogative to 
“buy up private power facilities for resale to communities 
wanting a public power source.”103 His legislation also sought to 
double the TVA’s bond issuing capacity.104 The TVA leadership 
attempted to secure this statutory authorization for an expansion 
to TVA powers in the spring of  1935. But, to its frustration, 
the TVA Board found the House Military Affairs Committee, 
the committee overseeing the TVA, to be less than compliant 
with their wishes. The Committee tabled the House version of  
Norris’ bill, supported by original TVA sponsor and committee 
chairman John Jackson McSwain (D-SC).105 
 As the dams rose on the Tennessee River, the nation’s 
attention and criticism turned to the TVA. In 1936, however, 
120,000 high school debate students answered the question: 
“Resolved, that all electric utilities should be governmentally 
owned.” Herbert Corey, the journalist covering the event, made 
no secret of  his position on that matter, although he wrapped his 
bias in a thin veil of  manufactured impartiality: “public ownership 
as a policy has failed in the Americas. It might be a necessity in the 
backward European countries where the people have lacked the 
intelligence and the enterprise on which industrial advancement 
is based.”106 The rampant bias on both sides of  the TVA issue 
reflected how deeply ingrained the public versus private power 
ownership issue was in the American political consciousness of  
the 1930s.
 Businessmen involved in the coal business were also 
concerned by the TVA’s activities. Senator Norris, unreserved 
in his criticism of  capitalist complaints, unleashed his usual 
indictments that businessmen were interfering in the national 
pilgrimage to public power. During the original struggle for 
the TVA’s passage, John L. Lewis, a coal executive, became one 
of  Norris’ targets. The Senator alleged, “Mr. Lewis’ attitude 
simply demonstrated that any man who stands in the way of  
human progress and seeks to prevent the use of  technological 
improvements is standing in his own way and blocking his 
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own progress.” Norris did not elaborate on who was granted 
the power to define “human progress.” Throughout the Age 
of  Infrastructure, Norris and his compatriots were completely 
convinced that their opinions were irreproachably correct and 
moral. Then, they married this unwavering confidence with 
technocratic implementation. Victory, not compromise, was 
the goal. Understandably, this recalcitrant orthodoxy generated 
problems. The opposition to the TVA was not limited to errant 
journalists soapboxing through public interest pieces or corporate 
representatives. A serious and determined resistance to the TVA’s 
encroachment emerged. Nevertheless, one of  the TVA’s greatest 
challenges was endogenous. Something was rotten in Knoxville. 
 The TVA’s triumvirate leadership began to disintegrate. 
The problems had begun shortly after the foundation of  the 
TVA in 1933, though it took several years for the severity of  
the dissention to permeate the public sphere. Chairman Arthur 
Morgan clashed with his fellow board members David Lilienthal 
and Harcourt Morgan over significant executive decisions. 
What had been a private struggle, especially between Chairman 
Morgan and Lilienthal, devolved into a public rhetorical brawl 
when Chairman Morgan levied indictments of  mismanagement 
and negligence against Lilienthal. For example, Chairman 
Morgan accused Lilienthal of  mishandling the negotiations with 
Alcoa over the Fontana Dam in North Carolina. Still, this was 
only one case in a succession of  outlandish accusations in which 
Chairman Morgan publically directed towards Lilienthal. After 
the Chairman interfered unreasonably in another spat known as 
the Berry marble issue, Lilienthal and Harcourt Morgan wrote 
to President Roosevelt requesting that Arthur Morgan resign.107 
However, Roosevelt, the only significant check on the Chairman’s 
power, did nothing. 
 Eventually, Arthur Morgan forced the President’s 
hand. After demanding a congressional investigation into the 
activities of  the other board members and suspicious TVA 
actions, Roosevelt sacked Chairman Morgan in March 1938. 
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The defamation continued during the subsequent investigation. 
Lilienthal and Harcourt Morgan alleged that Arthur Morgan had 
tried to “sabotage” the TVA as an agent of  the power trust.108 
Arthur Morgan shot back, making a series of  charges including 
“mismanagement of  the power program, conspiracy, and 
subservience to…special interests.”109 Throughout the summer 
of  1938, Lilienthal parried attacks from Arthur Morgan and the 
press, referring to the Chairman as “reckless, unreliable, and 
erratic.”110
 The “TVA Scandal” wrought havoc, distracting from 
the completion of  TVA priorities and fueling the agency’s 
critics. Arthur Morgan launched a messy lawsuit only to be 
defeated in the courts, further sullying his already-tainted image. 
Although the scandal abated, the series of  events tarnished the 
TVA’s administrative record. Confidence in the governance of  
appointed experts, thought to be immune to the petty politicking 
of  Congress and the underhanded tactics of  the business elites, 
was shaken. The Morgan crisis reminded Norris and the radical 
New Dealers of  an unpleasant reality. Many men, not just Henry 
Ford, were driven by avarice and a lust for the aggregation of  
power. Business, especially in the unregulated 1920s, was bluntly 
motivated by profit, much to Norris’ disgust. However, despite 
what Norris would have liked to have thought, government 
was no monolith of  unending altruism. It, like business, was 
composed of  men who sought to exercise a vision and the means 
to power. 
 The strife between Arthur Morgan and his two comrades 
illustrated how personal and petty concerns could derail the 
holy project of  the TVA. As the agency made great strides in 
raising dams along the rivers and stringing transmission lines 
along country roads, the TVA was bogged down in politics 
and hearings, eventually necessitating intervention from the 
President. Norris had handed the Board an immense amount 
of  institutional power backed by the full faith and credit of  the 
United States. The Morgan crisis proved that although the TVA 
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could reshape the countryside to suit man’s desires, it could 
not, even with its noble mandate, reshape those desires. It also 
demonstrated that the TVA, with its unusually long nine-year 
appointments for Board members, was as corruptible as any 
other government institution.
WENDELL WILLKIE’S WAR
 Chairman Arthur Morgan, though troublesome, was not 
the greatest foe the TVA faced during the 1930s. The TVA’s rapid 
expansion had generated enemies, and the power utilities grew 
increasingly concerned, especially as Norris proposed ever-bolder 
plans for a nationwide TVA-esque agency that would replace 
private power corporations. Throughout its early years, the TVA 
interacted with Commonwealth & Southern Corporation (C&S), 
a major U.S. utility holding company, and its dynamic, articulate 
president, Wendell Willkie. Concerned by government’s entry 
into the electricity market, Willkie proved more than a match for 
Lilienthal in Knoxville and Norris in Washington, D.C. as they 
fought over the future of  energy in the United States. Willkie 
challenged the fullest expression of  the progressive civil religion 
of  infrastructure, seeking to check the excesses of  the New Deal 
to preserve the competitive system that he and others felt was 
so central to the United States’ economic success and culture of  
individual liberty.
 In modern times, Wendell Willkie is best remembered 
as the Republican challenger to Roosevelt in the presidential 
election of  1940. That election was notable because Roosevelt 
broke with the Washingtonian tradition and marched towards an 
unprecedented third term in office with a healthy lead in votes. 
However, Willkie was no stooge of  the Republican establishment, 
nor was he a conservative purist. He was a dynamic, eloquent 
candidate and the most potent foe of  the TVA. Willkie was no 
politician either; he was hardly even a Republican, having been a 
Democrat until 1939. He was a business executive, trained as an 
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attorney, and eminently successful at his work. Promoted from 
counsel to president of  the influential C&S in 1933, Willkie was 
positioned to take control of  the company just as the TVA began 
organizing. More specifically, Willkie assumed authority when 
the TVA was poised to develop electricity systems in a region 
where the C&S already had a significant subsidiary presence. 
 Ironically, Willkie, a registered Democrat at the time 
and a regular attendee of  national party conventions, became 
the champion of  the anti-TVA movement. He stood against a 
Republican, Senator Norris, who stridently backed every New 
Deal proposal and fought for the TVA on every occasion.111 
Norris’ progressive faith, which previously had confounded 
partisanship, and Willkie’s defense of  economic liberty, made for 
strange alliances. Over the course of  the 1930s, Willkie would 
force Norris to shield the TVA, at the public podium and in 
the Capitol. The Nebraskan had fought for more than decade 
to tame the Tennessee River for the people of  the United States. 
Now, he would have to fight to keep it. 
Wendell Willkie, 
President of  Commonwealth 
& Southern Corporation
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 The TVA entered negotiations with C&S in 1933 to 
discuss a modus vivendi. In January 1934, C&S and the TVA reached 
a settlement in which the TVA agreed not to enter certain areas 
nor take C&S customers until a few months after the completion 
of  the Norris Dam. Much to the consternation of  C&S, the TVA 
immediately sped up construction of  the dam. Meanwhile, the 
TVA also strung transmission lines around cities currently served 
by utility companies and offered economic incentives for those 
municipalities to switch service to TVA power.112 Willkie strongly 
opposed the double standards which he felt were applied to the 
TVA. He argued that if  the TVA was subjected to the same 
“requirements binding private utilities,” it could not survive 
in the marketplace. Beyond general complaints of  unfairness, 
Willkie’s primary concern was the TVA’s creeping mandate. 
Congress tried to set limits on the scope of  its powers in the 
1935 bills through amendments in the appropriations package. 
However, the New Deal legislators had intervened, stripping 
out provisions that would have required audits, prohibited the 
sale of  surplus power under cost, and prevented the duplication 
of  transmission lines.113 Willkie, therefore, delivered a forceful 
condemnation of  this interference.114
 In 1935, Willkie railed against the TVA “yardstick” 
concept, a means to test the fairness of  electricity rates, and other 
TVA “frantic activity” that he viewed as designed to erode private 
utilities through unfair practices.115 President Roosevelt had first 
invoked the “yardstick” concept during his campaign in the 
presidential election of  1932 as a means through which the TVA 
could check the ability of  private operators to raise prices, similar 
to the discussions on rates that were seen in the Muscle Shoals 
hearings in 1922.116 Indeed, the “yardstick” concept was not 
included in the original TVA legislation, which troubled Willkie 
and other private operators. They felt that the TVA, afforded 
government advantages, would be a privileged competitor that 
would gradually encroach on their businesses. This was a correct 
assumption. Additionally, Willkie assumed that the trend of  
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subsidizing consumers “at the expense of  taxpayers” through 
government intervention would, if  not restrained, threaten the 
entirety of  the U.S. utility market.117 Furthermore, many private 
operators believed that the “yardstick” concept was less of  a 
means of  protecting consumers and more of  a ploy to bludgeon 
control of  power systems into government hands. To be sure, 
Roosevelt admitted in 1934 that “where the private interest and 
this public interest conflict, the public interest must prevail.”118 
Electric power had become the cynosure of  debate over the 
TVA.
 Corporate apprehensions about the growth of  the 
TVA’s mandate and intentions were substantiated by the 
difference between the focus of  the authorizing legislation—the 
Tennessee Valley Authority Act of  1933—which provided for 
the precedent-supported government regulation of  rivers for 
navigation and flood control, and the apparent driving focus 
of  the TVA, supplanting private power utilities. Electric power 
generation and transmission had been secondary elements of  
an April 1933 Senate Committee report for the TVA bill. The 
clear intention of  the bill was for flood control and navigation 
in the Tennessee Valley as well as the production of  fertilizers at 
Muscle Shoals. In fact, the report only mentions electric power in 
Clause Five.119 When one reflects upon the original intent of  the 
National Defense Act of  1916, the scope of  the transformation 
is even broader. Muscle Shoals began as an effort to produce 
critical nitrate for U.S. farmers and for the war effort during the 
First World War. The electric power was a means to produce 
that nitrate. By 1933, however, the project had evolved into a 
federal power scheme. This exercise of  federal prerogative was 
supported with little if  any precedent.
 Willkie blamed overzealous New Dealers for the TVA’s 
alleged overreaching. He released a statement in January 1938 
alleging that the TVA was as much an effort to neuter the 
private utility industry as it was to build infrastructure for the 
impoverished people of  the Tennessee Valley:
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There was no utility problem in the Tennessee Valley 
until the Federal Government created it. As soon as 
the Tennessee Valley Authority Act was passed in June 
1933, however, the Federal Government began to flood 
the Tennessee Valley with both money and propaganda 
on behalf  of  the government power projects. The 
government built dams, power plants, and transmission 
lines.120
Willkie, hoping to reach a workable arrangement with the TVA 
that protected the core interests of  C&S, had been willing to 
negotiate with Lilienthal in the early days of  TVA activities. As 
political scientist C. Herman Pritchett notes, “Several times during 
this period[,] Willkie, president of  Commonwealth & Southern, 
met with Lilienthal, power director of  the T.V.A., and presented 
suggestions for a division of  areas between the two agencies.”121 
However, Lilienthal was unwilling to negotiate, believing that the 
accommodation of  the private power interests was “contrary 
to the provisions of  the T.V.A. statute.”122 Whether demanding 
hard territorial limits on TVA activities from Roosevelt, 
litigating against the TVA over competition issues, or speaking 
to the American people with “a fluency and eloquence,” Willkie 
defended the principles of  American free enterprise against 
the power of  the popular progressive civil religion.123 Willkie’s 
national prominence opened his path to challenge Roosevelt 
in the presidential election of  1940, by which time he finally 
changed his registration to Republican.
 Willkie’s war and the TVA’s internal challenges tempered 
the scope of  Norris’ ambitions for government-operated 
utilities. Willkie reminded the American people that while 
the government could advance the public good, it could also 
advance it beyond appropriate, constitutional boundaries. The 
political intransigence of  the Muscle Shoals project in the 1920s 
suffocated development in the Tennessee Valley. For the farmers 
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of  Alabama and Tennessee, Congress moved too slowly. The 
TVA marched forward at a breakneck pace, erecting dams and 
electrifying counties. For some, the TVA was moving too quickly 
and without consideration for the consequences of  its actions.
 Some critics of  Norris’ proposals had warned of  
creeping socialism or bureaucratic planners run amok. Vehement 
opposition to government operations in the Tennessee Valley 
only served to prove the progressives’ point—the profit motive 
had corrupted every echelon of  society. Willkie’s strategic 
criticisms and trust-building efforts were far more constructive. 
He served as a necessary and natural check on the TVA. When 
it erred, Willkie pointed it out. When it ran roughshod over 
business interests, he illuminated the transgressions and offered 
proposals. Willkie tempered the excesses of  the progressive civil 
religion of  infrastructure. His efforts established a tenable middle 
ground between Norris’ dreams of  the total nationalization of  
utilities and the laissez-faire economics that epitomized the 
former Coolidge administration. Through that mediation, the 
nation achieved a workable coexistence between government-
led progress and individual-led progress. The TVA stands as a 
unique institution in the United States. Norris failed to realize his 
dream of  public power nationwide. However, the TVA survived 
the 1930s, remaining as a robust experiment that provided cheap 
power and good jobs to the people of  the Tennessee Valley.
THE AGE OF INFRASTRUCTURE
 The Age of  Infrastructure witnessed some of  the 
greatest public achievements in the United States. The TVA 
brought power to the people, bringing a vision of  hope to one 
of  the country’s poorest regions. It proved that government 
would not forget the most vulnerable Americans. Its successes 
represented the epitome of  Norris’ populist progressivism—
government, as a vanguard, would build a better society through 
the provision of  economic empowerment. The TVA was a 
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national effort, transcending the sectionalism of  pettier politics. 
Its foremost advocates included a plutocratic president from the 
Hudson River Valley and an agrarian populist senator from the 
Great Plains. For Norris, the United States was at its best when 
it led by example. This informed his isolationist tendencies and 
his commitment to communitarian modernism. Writing in 1944, 
Norris expressed a hope for a brave, new future of  American 
politics:
But so long as an unselfish leadership remains for [the 
American people’s] guidance—a leadership untainted 
by corrupting personal ambition—a leadership inspired 
by the simple strength that oozes from the soil and the 
humble ranks of  the poor—and at time is enriched 
and fortified enormously by the support and voice of  
those who wear purple robes of  great wealth—I am 
sure America can continue to be the bright beacon 
toward which the eyes of  the world’s oppressed and 
downtrodden will turn for inspiration and hope.124
The greatest tragedy of  Norris’ career was the dearth of  
Americans who could provide the “unselfish leadership” he 
desired. The destructive squabbling of  the TVA triumvirs proved 
that even the people’s technocracy was susceptible to the baser 
demons of  human nature.
 The TVA’s troubles paled compared to exploitations 
of  progressivism by men of  truly unbridled “personal 
ambition.” For them, the ends always justified the means and 
the Age of  Infrastructure created unparalleled methods for the 
materialization of  their vision. Under a banner of  social reform 
and modernity, city planner Robert Moses, another great builder 
of  public works, obtained unprecedented and unchecked power 
in New York. As he built an administrative empire, he cultivated 
and greedily protected his autonomous authority from any 
encroachment. Exploiting the ascendancy of  public investment 
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in infrastructure and justifying his actions under the broad 
umbrella of  societal progress, Moses bludgeoned any opponent 
who sought, like Norris’ Willkie, to moderate his activities. With 
imperious arrogance, Moses once remarked, “There are people 
who like things as they are…They cannot be permitted to stand 
in the way of  progress.”125 As he flattened poor and minority 
neighborhoods to build titanic highways, Moses meant this 
statement in its most literal sense. Either the people would move 
or he would move them.
 The TVA’s failings and Robert Moses’ autocracy 
revealed the dangers inherent to the progressive civil religion of  
infrastructure.126 Intention, regardless of  its moral rationalization, 
did not guarantee purely altruistic governance. The overarching 
theme of  this political faith was a profound confidence, bordering 
on arrogance, that the progressive powerbrokers knew what 
was best for the people. Unwavering faith in the righteousness 
of  one’s opinions translated into wholesale, uncompromising 
implementation and a flawed belief  that one could reengineer 
society to conform to their idea of  a democratic utopia. 
Institutions of  merit without checks became the realms of  the 
bureaucratic oligarchy.
 In forming the model of  the United States’ constitutional 
representative republic, James Madison recognized that 
government would need to check private ambitions for the 
safety of  the body politic. Progressives, including Woodrow 
Wilson, thought this cautious conservative form of  government 
obsolete for the modern age. Norris did worry about the 
ambitions of  men such as Henry Ford or the “power trusters,” 
but he equated the threat with unbridled industrial capitalism, 
not an overzealous government. Norris failed to recognize how 
his own works, however well-intentioned, created new, and often 
thoroughly undemocratic, avenues for the individual pursuit of  
power at the public’s expense. Sadly for this “gentle knight of  
American democracy,” his endless compassion for the plight of  
the poor was tainted by his own naïveté.127
52     Joseph Kiernan
The Age of Infrastructure
 Despite these setbacks, Norris’ contributions to building 
American democracy were monumental. During the 1920s, his 
national perspective and resolute integrity reinforced the people’s 
faith in their government in an era of  regionalism and endless 
scandals. In the 1930s, his ideology formed the rock upon which 
the New Deal was formed. Working hand-in-hand with President 
Roosevelt, Norris used an economic crisis to direct Americans’ 
attention to people whose Great Depression began decades earlier 
through a systematic pattern of  neglect, underinvestment, and 
environmental degradation. Through his determination, Norris 
took a weapon of  war, the Muscle Shoals project, and converted 
it into an instrument for the public welfare. Fittingly, the TVA 
would work to protect American democracy through a renewal 
of  equality and its defense against the forces of  fascism. Senator 
Norris’ strain of  progressivism shunned individualism while 
embracing communitarianism. It substantiated massive increases 
in federal authority while illuminating the darkest of  valleys. The 
TVA was the public church for a new civil religion: a nationalist, 
equalitarian, and materialist crusade for the betterment of  the 
people. Norris’ sermon was that the government’s responsibility 
was the promotion of  “happiness in this life” for all people, 
nationwide. His mission lives on in the rivers he mastered, the 
farms he electrified, and the futures he “Built for the People of  
the United States.”
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